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This paper examines how a traditional village deals with the consequences of population
growth.  The increase in population demands more intensive use of the land which
requires the transformation of commonly-owned land into privately-owned land.
Customary law contains clear prescriptions about the circumstances under which a couple
can privatize land.  We estimate this land accumulation rule using data from two villages in
the Cordillera Region of the Philippines.  In order to study the evolution of the distribution
of land, we model the inheritance practices of the community which constitutes another
aspect of customary law.  Finally, we use the model to show that despite the flexibility of
the customary law on land, the present rapid growth of the population given the limited
availability of land leads to its breakdown.  This could be avoided only if seven out of ten
children are able to make a living from occupations other than farming.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, several economists have studied the interaction between property rights,
population pressure and technology.  Migot-Adholla, Hazell, Blarel and Place (1991)
claim that population pressure has induced an automatic evolution within the system of
indigenous land tenure systems in Sub-Saharan Africa from communal property towards
private individual rights.  We find that a similar process has been at work in the Cordillera
Region of the Philippines.  Our paper attempts to model this process in that region.  As
such, the approach differs from that adopted by Feder and Feeny (1991).  They stress the
role of public infrastructure with regard to the certification and registration of the
ownership of land for an effective land rights system. In the context of small villages in
which land and credit markets have emerged only recently and in which the former is still
of minor importance as a means to acquire land, we look at how the customary law on
land copes with the changes wrought by increased population pressure.
2  This reaction is
embodied as part of customary law and we refer to it as the land accumulation rule.
In order to describe the dynamic evolution of the distribution of land, we need to
describe another aspect of customary law:  the set of rules which define inheritance
practices.  The more familiar inheritance rules are those of Equal Division and
Primogeniture.  In the former all property is divided equally among the children.  In the
latter, all property goes to the first-born child (General Primogeniture).  Primogeniture
may be restricted to the first-born son (Male Primogeniture) or the first-born daughter
(Female Primogeniture).  Assuming that each family has exactly two children, Blinder
(1973) and Atkinson (1980) have analyzed the influence of these inheritance rules on the
distribution of wealth.  Cowell (1991) introduces differences in household size in the
analysis of general equal division.  Van de gaer (1997) makes similar assumptions as
Cowell regarding differences in household size and focuses on a comparison of different
inheritance rules and the importance of marriage patterns.  This paper adopts the latter ’s
framework to deal with the traditional inheritance practices in the Cordillera villages.
Now imagine an agricultural community settled in a mountainous region.  Rice is
one of the staple crops that the people want to grow.  In order to grow rice, land has to be
                                                       
2 Feder and Feeny (1991: 147) recognize that "...in areas where credit and land markets are not yet
developed, an investment in titling and land registration may entail an excessive cost in comparison with
the benefits, and security of tenure can be enhanced by cheaper methods such as legalizing the authority of
local institutions."2
irrigated.  This requires that irrigation canals are built and given the nature of the terrain
that terraces are also constructed.  Wet-rice cultivation, thus, requires the input of a lot of
labor.  People are more willing to undertake these investments if they can individually reap
the benefits from these investments (see Feder and Noronha, 1987; Feder and Feeny,
1991; Migot-Adholla, et. al., 1991).  Irrigated rice fields will therefore be private property
which couples can own and pass on to their offspring.  In many societies, there are clear
rules which describe who inherits what from whom.  We will analyze the inheritance rules
applicable in parts of the Cordillera in the Philippines in section 3.
Other land which is not improved upon in the way described above can be used for
growing root crops, pasturing of animals, or as forests from which people collect wood
for fuel and lumber.  These types of land are more likely to be common property.  Even
here, clear rules prescribe who may have rights to these uses since a misuse of the land by
one individual will affect what everyone else gets out of it.  Since the communities which
we study are fairly small, the enforcement of these rules poses no major problems.
As long as the population remains stable, there is no incentive to convert common
land into private land.  Once the population starts to increase, a further intensification of
agriculture and an increase in rice production becomes necessary (see e.g. Boserup, 1976).
These can only be done by transforming common land into private land, i.e. irrigated rice
fields.  There are two reasons why the village will regulate this process.  First, the land
which can be converted is common land, and its use has been delimited by rules upheld by
all members of the community.  Transforming common property rights into private
individual rights is therefore subject to community approval.  Second, an unregulated
transformation of common land into private land can have disadvantageous effects on all
people of the community using the land.  In addition, some people will be affected more
than others.  Those who have little of privately-owned land might be deprived of their
means of subsistence.  As a consequence, the village will prescribe when a family can
increase its land holdings, and how much a family is allowed to take out of the commons
and turn it into privately-owned land.  We will model this process of land accumulation in
section 4 and use data on two villages to estimate the parameters of this process.
Then due to improvements in public health measures the population increases
drastically.  The previous arrangements for transforming common land into private land
may no longer be sustainable.  In view of the mountainous nature of the terrain, not all
common land can be suitably turned into irrigated rice fields: springs cannot be found3
everywhere and it is costly to transport the water from the river to rice fields located along
the higher slopes of the mountain. We will investigate whether the institutional
arrangements for transforming common land into privately-owned rice fields do break
down.  Finally, the whole set of traditions and customs described above such as
inheritance practices and the land accumulation rule, might be maintained even when the
population increases dramatically provided a substantial part of the younger generation
emigrates or finds employment outside the agricultural sector.  We will calculate how big
a fraction of the younger generation should take this outside option.
We begin in section 2 with a description of that part of the customary law on land
in some villages in the Cordillera which deals with the issues raised above.
2.  ACCESS TO LAND AND CUSTOMARY LAW
In Cordillera villages, the customary law on land recognizes both common and
individual property rights.  These rights define the use, access, and transfer of land.  There
are two types of common property: communal and corporate (see, e.g., Prill-Brett, 1993:
1).  In the former, rights to use belong to each member of the village.  In the latter,
usufruct rights are restricted to members of a descent group.  The most restrictive rights
apply under private individual ownership.  Forest and pasture lands are communal,
swiddens are corporate, and irrigated rice fields (payew) are private.
Table 1 shows how couples can have access to agricultural land in two Cordillera
villages.4
Table 1:  MEAN SIZES OF LAND BY TYPE OF ACCESS (in sq. m.)
TYPES OF ACCESS Village 1
N=29           Mean*
Village 2
N=48           Mean*
By inheritance
Irrigated W 7 4507 24 1295
M 10 4482 24 1611
Other W 7 2855 22 422
M 11 5750 20 1311
By usufruct rights
Irrigated W’ clan 1 10000 4 588
M’ clan 0 - 4 1018
Other W’ clan 3 550 4 2105
M’clan 4 2207 2 135
Com’nty 0 - 4 122
By Sharecropping 4 4966 3 257
By Rental 2 7500 11 2536
By Purchase 2 2166 4 562
*This refers to the conditional mean; i.e. for values above zero.
Access to land is by inheritance, by usufruct rights, by sharecropping, by renting
and by purchase.  The land may be irrigated or not.  As the table shows, access to land by
inheritance through either the husband (M) or the wife (W) is quite important.  The access
to both kinds of land, irrigated or not, is very similar.  There does not appear to be any
discrimination between men and women regarding land ownership as far as the distribution
of inherited irrigated land is concerned.  However, the other land appears unevenly
distributed between men and women and this results in an unequal distribution of their
total land.
3 Non-irrigated land consists of forests, pastures or swiddens.  Although the
traditional means of access to land through inheritance and usufruct continue to remain
dominant, access to land through purchase and rental has recently become more common.
Renting occurs more frequently in Village 2 while sharecropping is more frequent in
Village 1.
Customary law prescribes how and when members of the village can segregate
land out of commonly-owned property and thereby transform its ownership.  When
permanent improvements are made on land such as building of irrigation canals, or5
terracing; and there is occupation and cultivation for a prolonged period of time (i.e. five
years) without interruption
4, the land becomes privately-owned.  In this manner a couple
can increase its land holdings during its existence.  Since land is passed on when a child is
married, the family land at such time will consist of each spouse’s inherited land.  Land to
which a couple has only use rights can become exclusive to them under the above-
mentioned conditions.  Such acquired land together with the individual spouse’s inherited
land are devolved to the couple’s heirs as their exclusive private property.  The land
acquisition function describes the process by which couples can acquire land under this
customary law.  Since improving the land requires a lot of labor, it is limited by the
number of labor hands of family members.  If a family attempts to improve more land than
it actually needs, its action will merit village disapproval.  Given these, we can suppose
that the amount of land a family can obtain depends upon the number of children in the
family.
The way irrigated land is devolved combines bilateral primogeniture with equal
division. Bilateral primogeniture
5 is applied to the part of the property which is inherited
and ‘equal division’ is applied to that which is acquired.  We can formalize bilateral
primogeniture as follows.  Let k stand for the number of children in the family.  Given k,
land is devolved to its heirs in the following manner:
k=1: If the child is a boy, he gets his father’s inherited land.  If it’s a girl,
she gets her mother’s inherited land.
k>1 and there is at least one boy and one girl: The eldest son gets his
father’s land, the eldest daughter gets her mother’s land.
k>1 and all children are of the same sex: The eldest child inherits the land
of the same-sexed parent.  The second child receives the land of the other
parent.
The children who inherit land in this way will be called primary heirs.  Those who
inherit the acquired land, we shall label secondary heirs.  A fraction ( ) 1- q  of families is
                                                                                                                                                                    
3 Davies and Zhang (1995), using Quisumbing’s (1994) data find evidence of a fairly strong pure sex
preference for males.  Perhaps a similar mechanism is at work for the other type of land.  Since customary
law is less rigidly applied to this other type, there is more room for parental sex preference.
4 As Prill-Brett (1993: 14) puts it: “Another condition under which common land transforms into
individual property with restricted rights of use, is the construction of irrigated rice fields ... The
channeling of water from a nearby water source, the construction of an irrigation canal to transport water
to the field, the construction of retaining stone walls, the transporting of soil nutrients into the constructed
pond field, and the sustained production of rice through continuous cropping, transforms the land use
system.”6
allowed to accumulate land which they can devolve to the other children who do not have
claims on either parent’s inherited land.  Note that it is not necessarily an advantage to be
a primary heir.  This will be the case when the inherited land of the parent is smaller than
the acquired land which is given to the secondary heirs
6.
Two further remarks complete our description of this inheritance rule.  First, if the
heir assigned by the rule does not exist, then the land becomes common land.  This
happens when a couple is childless or when they have only one child such that there is no
heir to either the father or mother’s fortune
7.  Second, a fraction l of those who own land
might lose their land.  Land can be lost when it is given as payment for a fine for personal
offenses such as theft
8.  Or due to adverse circumstances, one is forced to sell the land,
usually to one’s kinsmen.  In these cases, the heir assigned by the rule will receive no land
at all.  We will now analyze the customary law just described formally.
3.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF CUSTOMARY LAW ON LAND
(a) Evolution of the distribution of land
Let the probability that a couple has k children be given by  pk
9 and a family can






.  The number of boys is on the average equal
to the number of girls.  We assume that the population can be represented by a continuum
of individuals.  At time zero, we normalize the total male or female population such that
they are represented by the interval [ ] 01 , .
10   [ ] H x t
i , i=m or w, is a measure of the number
of men or women having land smaller than or equal to x at time t.  From the normalization
                                                                                                                                                                    
5 The inheritance rule analyzed here (also referred to as homoparentalism) has to be distinguished from
the  rule of General Primogeniture which most wet rice agricultural societies in the Central Cordillera
traditionally practiced (personal communication with June Prill-Brett, 15 October 1996).
6 In our sample, the mean land size inherited by first born children, who are primary heirs, was not
different from the mean land size inherited by later-born children.
7 We adopt this interpretation in consonance with the idea that ‘should a couple fail to produce an
offspring, and one of the spouses dies, the property of the deceased reverts to his/her natal family, to be
reassigned to another heir’ (see, Prill-Brett, 1993: 20).  In our model, we assume that the procedure by
which the land is reassigned follows that by which a family is allowed to acquire land.
8 See Prill-Brett, 1993: 19.
9 We follow Cowell (1991) in assuming that fertility is independent of the amount of land owned by each
family and that the distribution of the couples on the basis of the number of children remains constant.
For a traditional economy, this assumption is not unreasonable (see, e.g., Boserup, 1976).  Pryor (1973)
simulates among others the influence of differences in fertility between rich and poor people under
General Primogeniture and Equal Division.
10 The large population assumption has the advantage that the number of men is equal to the number of
women.  The fraction of men and women which do not get married are included in p0 , the fraction of
couples that do not produce children.7
above, it follows that  [ ] ( ) H n t
i t ¥ = + 1 , where n is the growth rate of the population such
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 and n > -1.  Of greater interest than the evolution of the
absolute number is the evolution of the relative number of women or men who own no
more than x.  This is captured by the cumulative distribution function   [ ] F x t
i .  Where
defined, [ ] f x t
i  is the corresponding density.  We have that  [ ] ( ) [ ] H x n F x t
i t
t
i = + 1
Assuming that K ‡ 3, there are three ways in which a male child can inherit land.
11
He could be the first born son and inherit his father’s land.  Such an heir will exist with
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= ￿ , which is 1 minus the probability that there are no
children and the probability that there are only daughters.  He could be the second son
and, in the absence of a sister, inherit his mother’s land.  The probability for this event is








= ￿ .  In these two cases, he will inherit the land provided his parents did not
lose it.  The probability of land loss is l.  Finally, he could have been one of the children in
a large family ( ) k ‡ 3 , and get his share from the land which his parents acquired during
their marriage.  The probability that his parents are allowed to acquire land is ( ) 1- q .  If
his parents bequeath land of size x to their children through the third way, on average
(1/2) (k-2) boys will inherit this size of land.  As a consequence of all these, the number of
male children inheriting land size x at time t,  [ ] h x t
m , depends on the number of men and
women who inherited the same amount of land in the previous period,  [ ] h x t
m
-1  and  [ ] h x t
w
-1
respectively, and the number of families with k children that bequeath x to their children,
[ ] h x t
k
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Our main interest is in the distribution of land.  We can divide the equation above
by ( ) 1+ n
t , the total number of men at time t to get an equation describing the evolution
of the frequency distribution of land:
                                                       
11 The problem for the evolution of women's land is symmetric.  For now we focus on the problem of
men's land.8
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where  [ ] f x t
m  is the density of men which, at time t, own an amount of land equal to x,
given that the family has acquired a positive amount of land.  [ ] f x t
w  denotes the
corresponding density for women, and  [ ] f x t
uk
-1  is the density of the inheritance x coming
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and using
the fact that the  pk add up to 1, it is easy to verify that the weights attached to the
densities at the RHS of the equation sum to 1.
Concomitantly, a son will not inherit land in the following cases.  He is the primary
heir of his father (or mother) who has no land to give since he (she) has none.  A parent
will have no land to pass on to an heir because either he did not inherit any land or if he
did, has lost it.  Alternatively, he is the secondary heir of couples who did not accumulate
any land.  Therefore, the density of zero land holdings is given by
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
f
n
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This yields:
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The above equations describe the evolution of the densities of land owned by men
and women as a system of first order difference equations.  Therefore, the density of the
distribution of land at each point [ ] x  and at each point in time is a weighted average of the
corresponding densities of the initial and final distribution of land (see proposition 1 in the
appendix).  The weights given to the initial distribution decline as time passes by, while the
weights attached to the equilibrium distribution increase.  The steady state distribution will
be completely independent of the initial distribution.
Because of the symmetric treatment of men and women by both the inheritance and the
accumulation rules the steady state distribution of men and women’s land is the same.
Moreover, if the initial distribution of land of men and women is the same, then the9
distribution of land for both sexes will be equal.  In that case the distribution of land will
be discrimination-free at each point in time.
The literature analyzing the dynamics of wealth distribution pays a lot of attention
to the speed at which the steady state distribution is approached and to the latter’s
properties.  The comparative static properties of the steady state distribution and of the
speed at which the steady state distribution is approached are fairly straightforward (see
corollary 1).
The higher the probability that a parent loses his land, the faster the steady state
distribution is approached.  The higher l is, the sooner the initial wealth holdings
disappear.  If the size of the population increases, then the equilibrium distribution is
approached more rapidly.  n increases when the number of small families decreases and the
number of large families increases.  In larger families relatively more children inherit
acquired land.  Since the distribution of acquired land determines the steady state
distribution, the increase in the number of large families will increase the speed of
convergence to the steady state distribution.  At the same time the relative number of
primary heirs (i.e., the heirs to the parents' inherited land) may decrease due to a decrease
in  p0 or  p1.  And this diminishes the importance of the initial distribution.
The equilibrium distribution of land is completely determined by the demographic
composition of the population, as reflected by the pk , and the amount of land acquired by
a family during its existence.  This is not surprising since, with  pk „ 0 for at least one
value of k < 2  all initially private land holdings will become common land sooner or later.
Then the future generations remain landless until the family is allowed to acquire land.  A
dynasty is allowed to do so sooner or later provided  pk > 0 for some k ‡ 3.  In summary,
each family's land becomes acquired land and is transferred to the next generation through
the rule that applies to this type of land.
12
                                                       
12 More specifically, the equilibrium density of land at each point x > 0 is a weighted linear average of the
densities of the K-2 distributions of acquired land at that same point.  The relative weights of each of the
densities depend on  ( ) ( ) k pk - 2 2 /  , the expected number of male/female secondary heirs of a family with
k>2 children.  The similarities are striking when we compare this result with the one obtained for equal
division by Cowell (1991).  In his framework, the distribution of the younger generation’s wealth is a
linear weighted mean of K values of wealth in the older generation.  Here saving is proportional to the
older generation’s wealth.  In our context, saving is equivalent to the amount of acquired land.  Cowell’s
result comes quite close to the result obtained here for our system of bilateral primogeniture for primary
heirs and equal division among secondary heirs.  This is expected since the rule of equal division among
the secondary heirs applied to acquired land determines our steady state distribution completely.10
The form of the equilibrium distribution depends on the  pk  and  [ ] f x
uk
exclusively.  q and  l only blow up the form of the equilibrium distribution.  If q and l
would both be zero, everybody will own land eventually.  If q = 1 nobody is allowed to
acquire any land and asymptotically nobody owns any land.  Then, all land will be
common. When l = 0 and q = 1, we get a version of our inheritance rule where only
primary heirs exist.  Also then, nobody will own any land in the steady state, since every
sequence of primary heirs will terminate at some point.
The number of landless individuals is increasing in l, q, and  ~ ~ a a 1 2 +  and decreasing
in p (see corollary 2).  The latter is the average number of men or women who inherit
from the land acquired by the family.  The larger p is, the greater the relative number of
children inheriting a positive amount of land. ( ) ~ ~ a a 1 2 +  is the probability that there is a
primary heir to a parent’s fortune.  If a parent has lost his inheritance, then there will be on
average ~ ~ a a 1 2 +  heirs who inherit nothing.  The comparative static properties for positive
land sizes mirror these results.
(b)  Amount of arable land and population growth
We have now derived the steady state distribution of land, assuming that the
process can be repeated indefinitely.  Implicitly it was assumed that the amount of land
that could be made suited for wet-rice cultivation was unlimited.  Generally this type of
land would be limited even when villagers could, as they did, begin new settlements when
land in the original village sites became scarce.  The relationship between the land
accumulation rule, the probabilities to acquire or to lose land, the size distribution of
families, and the growth of the total amount of irrigated land is described in this section
and proposition 2 in the appendix.
The more generous the accumulation rule and the higher the probability that a
family can accumulate land, the more land is claimed.  Therefore the faster the total
amount of irrigated land has to grow.  The greater the possibility that a family loses its
land, l, and the greater the proportion of families without direct heirs,  ( ) p p 0 1 1 2 + , the
more private land becomes common, and hence the smaller the growth of the total amount
of irrigated land.
It is clear that when the population grows fast, the pressure on the amount of land
increases.  To assume a stable size of the population cannot be justified given the recent11
experience in the region, nor by our data.  Yet, the assumption need not be objectionable if
we redefine the  pk in the model as the distribution of the number of children who take up
farming.  Suppose that there are many children who do not take up farming.  And let us
also assume that these children do not receive any land but may instead receive something
else as their inheritance.  This could be money to finance a college education, or to
purchase farm land in another part of the country or to start a small business.  Then
everything might go on exactly as described here.  Provided that the number of farmers
remains constant, a steady state amount of irrigated land for the community will exist.
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS
a.  The villages
13
The two villages we consider are Cudog (Village 1), located in the municipality of
Lagawe, province of Ifugao and Sagada
14 (Village 2), located in the Mountain Province.
In 1992 there were 174 households in Cudog and 290 households in Sagada.  We have a
sample of 29 and 48 families for the two villages, respectively.  Our sample indicates that
village 1 is more agriculturally based than village 2.  In the former, all households had farm
work as a means of livelihood.  Sixty-four per cent of households relied only on farm work
while 36 per cent combined farm with off-farm work as sources of livelihood.  In village 2,
a smaller 46 per cent of households relied only on farm work while a larger 40 per cent
relied on both farm and off-farm work for their livelihood.  About 15 per cent of
households compared to none in village 1, were completely engaged in off-farm work  In
Village 1, 52 per cent of the households planted rice as their primary crop while 14 per
cent planted rice and cash crops compared to a smaller 44 per cent and 8 per cent,
respectively, in Village 2.
Table 2 presents some characteristics for the sample of couples in the two villages.
Individuals have received more education in village 2 compared to village 1.  The average
family size is larger in village 2 than in village 1.  Given the standard deviation around the
mean however, these differences are not statistically significant.
                                                       
13 The data described here is part of a larger data set collected through a survey of rural households from
two villages in the Cordillera Region.  Based on community census data (1992) and field work done by the
Natural Resource Management Research Program (NRMP) of the Cordillera Studies Center, UP College
Baguio, a structured questionnaire was constructed with which interviews were conducted in April and
May of 1994.  This data set was collected for the dissertation research of the second author.
14 We use the term to refer to the two barangays of Patay and Suyo and not to the whole municipality.12
Table 2:  SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE
Village Mean Std Dev Min Max N
years of schooling of husband 1 5.59 4.29 0.0 14.0 29
2 7.88 4.48 0.0 14.0 48
years of schooling of wife 1 5.86 4.57 0.0 14.0 29
2 7.79 5.46 0.0 14.0 48
family size 1 6.34 2.61 2.0 11.0 29
2 7.62 2.43 3.0 13.0 48
Differences in family size were crucial for our framework.  In order to take this
into account, we needed data on the number of children in families which have reached
their full size.  The second and fifth columns of Table 3 give the distribution of families
according to the number of children for those in the sample where the youngest child is at
least five years old.  Although the distribution has the expected feature of a few large
families, it looks a bit erratic.  This is probably due to the small number of observations.
In addition, assuming that everybody gets married, this distribution of family sizes implies
a population growth of 189 per cent from one generation to the next
15.  It is difficult to
maintain these  pk , particularly if it would reflect the constant distribution of the number
of farmers generated by couples.  In order to test the sensitivity of our results to the values
for family sizes, we replicated the analysis with the Belgian distribution of household sizes
in 1910.  The data are given in the third and sixth columns of the table and imply a
population growth of 31 per cent between successive generations
16.
                                                       
15 The population growth in the Cordillera region was 2.53 per cent per year in 1994 (National Statistics
Office, Manila).  If you take one generation to be 30 years, this amounts to about 112% per generation.
Because of the emigration out of the small villages, and their traditional nature, population growth in
these villages might be a lot higher, however.
16 This number is more in line with Boserup’s (1976) contention that “the most reasonable assumption
about past demographic trends seems to be that some unfortunate peoples, decimated by disease and war,
had negative rates of population growth and disappeared, while other more fortunate ones had positive,
but fairly low, rates of growth over long periods.” (p.23)13

















       0 0.027 0.190         6 0.217 0.048
       1 0.081 0.230         7 0.162 0.033
       2 0.054 0.185         8 0.054 0.020
       3 0.027 0.130         9 0.135 0.012
       4 0.081 0.094        10 0.027 0.009
       5 0.108 0.067        11 0.027 0.006
We have already discussed the characteristics of the distribution of land in section
2.  To get some idea about the distribution of inherited irrigated land, we depict the
frequency distribution of the distribution of men and women’s land in village 2.  With very
few observations from village 1 we cannot do the same for that village.  Since for land
sizes of more than 1000 square meters the observations are spread too far apart, we limit
the range to land sizes smaller than 1000 m².  There are 33 observations in this range.
FIGURE 1:  Frequency Distribution of Small-Sized Irrigated Land in Village 2








The distribution has the familiar hump-shape and one might recognize a lognormal
distribution, which is not unfamiliar in the literature on the distribution of wealth (see, e.g.
Gibrat, 1933; Brown, 1988).
                                                       
17 Since the family with no children has the wife aged over 40, we included this case.
18 See NIS (1965).17
Now we have the necessary components to calculate the steady state distribution
of irrigated land which follows from the application of the inheritance rule and the land
accumulation rule embodied in this customary law of the Cordillera villages.  Taking the
observed frequencies of zeros as the steady state number of zeros in the two villages,  the
expression for the steady state number of zeros (see corollary 2) implies a restriction
between the values of q and l for each village.  Assuming l to be the same in both villages,
and setting l=0.05, we can calculate the values of q for both villages (q1 0 69 = .  and
q2 0 47 = . ).  Then, we can compare the Lorenz curves of the steady state distribution of
irrigated land for the two villages.  The Lorenz curve for village 1 lies everywhere below
the Lorenz curve for village 2.
25  Therefore, land is more unequally distributed in village 1
than in village 2.
FIGURE 3:  The Lorenz Curve for the Steady State Distribution of Irrigated Land








(d)  Population growth and the land constraint:  some simulations
As was noted in section 3b, our model can only reach a steady state when the total
amount of irrigated land grows as fast as the population.  Given the dramatic increase in
the population (see also Table 3) and the natural and geographical
26 limits to the amount
of land which can be made suitable for intensive cultivation, this assumption is hard to
maintain.  Therefore, we will consider the following scenarios.
                                                       
25 This conclusion is not sensitive with respect to the particular value chosen for l.
26 Remember that these villages have a mountainous and rugged terrain.  Where the slopes become less
steep, the landscape remains hilly and sloping.19








q 0.47 0.72 0.61 1391
l 0.05 0.46 0.61 1391
a 2894 1481 0.5 1078
b 0.36 -0.34 0.5 1078
h 1.00 0.74   0.56 1233
(B) LAND CONSTRAINT AND POPULATION EXPLOSION
Parameter Base case
values




q 0.47 0.97   0.83 1063
l 0.05 2.08
a 2894 157 0.5 367
b 0.36 -1.98 0.5 367
h 1.00 0.29   0.86 1327
It is clear that customary law, with regard to the devolution of inherited land and
the acquisition of land from the commons for restricted private use and control, has a hard
time to deal with the scenarios we considered.  The first scenario already implies dramatic
changes in customary law.  The number of families allowed to accumulate land needs to be
halved, the probability that a family looses its land has to be multiplied by a factor of nine,
the amount of land that a family is allowed to accumulate needs to be halved or large
families have to be severely punished.   Matters are even worse in the second scenario.
Let us take the value of l, which becomes greater than 1.  This indicates that, even if we
could expropriate all present land holdings and use this to give to those families which
could acquire land, the amount will not be sufficient.  The values of the other parameters
indicate a similar conclusion.  If only 3 percent of the households are allowed to acquire
land, or if the amount of land a couple can acquire is only one fifteenth of what it used to
be, or if large families are severely punished such that they are able to acquire much less21
Indeed, the probability that there will be exactly k farmers in a family with i (i k ‡ )
children is binomially distributed.  Multiplying this binomial probability with  pi and
summing over all i results in the expression above.  We can now insert the resulting  $ pk  in
the equation of Proposition 2 and search for the value of h such that gt = 0. The result is
given in the last row of Table 5.  We interpret this result as indicating that if customary
law is maintained as it is, but is only applicable to the children who farm, then, given the
present rate of population growth and the geographical limits, seven out of ten children
cannot become farmers in their village of origin.   If the village were only confronted with
the land constraint, one out  of four children cannot farm in its village of origin.  These
children will either have to migrate, or take up a non-farming job.  Given the poor
performance of the Philippine economy with respect to job creation outside of farming
(see, e.g., Balisacan, 1993), this constitutes a considerable challenge for government
policy.  Finally, note that the transformation of probabilities described above makes
families where many children become farmers less frequent.  Since compensation for
family size is incomplete, this increases the average plot size inherited by secondary heirs,
thereby increasing the conditional mean land size.
5. CONCLUSION
Customary law responds to changes in the environment.  This observation stands
out clearly in the case of Cordillera villages.  Population pressure necessitated an
intensification of agriculture thereby requiring the transformation of common land into
privately-owned land. The land accumulation rule is an institutionalized arrangement to
transform common unimproved land into private irrigated rice fields.  Since we wanted to
study the evolution of the distribution of irrigated land, we needed to look into the
inheritance rules practiced in the locality. Here, the inheritance rule applies bilateral
primogeniture for the couple’s inherited land and applies equal division among the other
children for the couple’s accumulated land.  It does not discriminate among offspring on
the basis of sex.  The distribution of land at each point in time is a weighted average of the
initial and steady state distribution.  This unique, globally stable steady state distribution is
itself a weighted average of the distribution of the inheritances which result from the land
acquired by families of different sizes.  Hence, the land accumulation rule is crucial for the
steady state distribution of land.22
We used data on two villages to estimate the land acquisition function.  We
attempted to investigate whether families with more children as compared to families with
fewer children are more able to increase the number of their rice fields through
transforming parcels from commonly-owned land.  Although far from conclusive, our
results indicate that some compensation for the number of children takes place, though
compensation is far from complete.  It is important to stress that though irrigated land is
most valued, it constitutes only part of the total amount of land to which family members
have access.  There are other mechanisms in the property rights system, (i.e., usufruct
rights to communal or corporate land) that provide for the matching of family resources
and family needs.  And the transformation of commonly owned land into private
ownership will influence the role of these channels.
Now that the geographical limits to the land transformation process have been
reached and with the population rapidly growing, one does wonder how the traditional
property system can adjust to these new circumstances.  Customary law in these villages
has more channels of adjustment than the inheritance practices traditionally analyzed by
economists such as Primogeniture and Equal Division.  One way is that more people are
made landless.  In the present system, this can be achieved by allowing less people to
acquire land or by increasing the fraction of people who lose their land.  Another way is
that the land holdings of those who have land can be decreased.  Again there are two ways
to achieve this.  It can be done by decreasing proportionately the amount of acquired land
by all families, or by decreasing the compensation provided for large families. We have
used the estimation results to investigate how customary law might adapt to population
pressure.  These options will have different distributional effects within the class of
landowning families.  Unfortunately, our simulation results suggest that with the present
rapid growth of population, these theoretical possibilities will not suffice.
There is a final scenario where customary law may be maintained in exactly the
way it has been practiced.  This requires an increase in the opportunities offered for the
children of farmers. It also requires the reformulation of the inheritance rule such that only
children who choose to be farmers can inherit land from their parents.  Given the recent
demographic developments in the region and the exhaustion of the amount of land suited
for intensive cultivation, we estimated that 71 per cent of the children should find a non-
farm job or emigrate.  Here is a considerable challenge for public policy at both the
regional and national levels.28
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